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The recent spate of severe ﬁnancial crises has provoked an interest in
international monetary reform not seen since the breakdown of the ﬁxed
exchange rate system 30 years ago. In the 1980s the Latin debt crisis was
widely viewed as the result of national policy mistakes and the impru-
dence of U.S. banks rather than of ﬂaws in the international ﬁnancial
“system.” Similarly, the 1994–95 Mexican crisis was seen primarily as a
hemispheric problem reﬂecting Mexican errors. By contrast, the recent
turmoil, which started in “paragon” economies and assumed global
dimensions, has stirred much introspection within the economics profes-
sion as well as considerable concern about international monetary
arrangements per se.
More tellingly perhaps, the current concerns have actually produced
action—in the multilateral institutions, the LDCs, and the investment
community. For example, IMF members have set up a Supplemental
Reserve Facility to allow a more rapid dispersal of large sums to countries
facing a sudden loss of conﬁdence; efforts to increase disclosure and
transparency are under way; and private investors are reassessing their
risk management models. While these initiatives may represent a useful
start on better prevention and management of ﬁnancial crises, recent
events in Mexico and East Asia have revealed potential ﬂaws in the
current international monetary system that may warrant more funda-
mental change. For instance, the characterization of some of these crises
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Bulsook and Matthew LaPenta also contributed.as ﬁnancial panics has strengthened the case for an effective international
lender of last resort. And the massive reversals in short-term capital ﬂows
that triggered these collapses have prompted calls for developing coun-
tries to reconsider the risks of open capital markets and the merits of
capital controls. Indeed, the recent crises have forced both academic
economists and policymakers to question some of their most basic
assumptions about the appropriate design of the international monetary
system.
Accordingly, this paper begins by reviewing recent changes in the
economic environment that have provoked this interest in reform. In so
doing, it points to the difﬁcult choices facing policymakers during a crisis
and asks if existing international monetary arrangements amplify the
impact of national policy mistakes. The paper then explores how policy
choices concerning four key aspects of the international monetary sys-
tem—exchange rate regimes, treatment of capital ﬂows, international
lender of last resort facilities, and policy coordination—interact to sup-
port or undermine national efforts to achieve stable economic growth.
Despite the urgent need for sound policy advice, this survey ﬁnds
that our understanding of many of the most pressing issues remains
incomplete. Indeed, recent crises have shaken the economics profession’s
conﬁdence concerning several basic issues, including its ability to pre-
scribe appropriate exchange rate policy. While the arguments against
devoting monetary policy to maintaining exchange rate stability seem
compelling, the profession remains divided as to whether countries
should let the exchange rate ﬂoat freely or should adopt irrevocably ﬁxed
rates, or even as to whether any intermediate arrangement is viable.
Opinion also differs on how to weight the pros and cons of capital
account liberalization.
Nevertheless, observers have already drawn a series of important
lessons from recent crises. In particular, it is abundantly clear that
developing countries must be wary of liberalizing their capital accounts
without adequate institutions for monitoring the soundness of their
banking sector. And greater transparency, disclosure, and governance are
crucially important to improving supervision and reducing moral haz-
ard. Even so, crises will likely remain a recurrent feature of global
ﬁnancial life.
Beyond these lessons, the paper also posits the need for more
fundamental change. In particular, while free capital markets may
promote growth over the long run, capital ﬂows can be highly destabi-
lizing in the short run; thus, contrary to conventional wisdom (at least
until very recently), capital controls in some form may be advisable for
some countries at some times. The paper also suggests that inadequate
policy coordination and surveillance and the lack of an effective lender of
last resort contributed to recent crises. Thus, the paper proposes consid-
ering how to design an international lender of last resort that could
42 Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. Oliveimitigate the disruptive effects of ﬁnancial panics by providing timely
short-term liquidity to banking systems in need. Market-based surveil-
lance could help to limit the scope for international lender-of-last-resort
intervention and might render more effective oversight than multilateral
institutions have generally achieved. Finally, the paper points out that
issues of international policy coordination and emergency liquidity are
likely to prove irrepressible, surfacing at the regional level if not
addressed globally.
The paper proceeds as follows. It ﬁrst addresses both the proximate
and the more fundamental causes for the interest in reform. It then
provides an overview of the debate surrounding optimal exchange rate
arrangements, capital market rules, international lender-of-last-resort
facilities, and policy cooperation. Obviously, each of these issues affects
the others, and any proposal for reforming the system must adopt a
unifying perspective. The last section offers concluding remarks.
WHY HAS INTEREST IN REFORM INTENSIFIED?T HE
PROXIMATE CAUSES
Interest in reform has intensiﬁed because ﬁnancial crises are viewed
as becoming more frequent, more severe, and less predictable. These
perceptions are (partly) correct. According to an index developed by the
World Bank,1 the frequency of banking and currency crises did indeed
surge in both the 1980s and 1990s, as compared with the 1970s (Figure 1).
Moreover, the frequency of recent crises has far exceeded the historical
average of one per decade chronicled by Kindleberger (1989). As for the
costs of these crises, in the frontline nations the immediate loss of output
tends to be very large compared with that in a typical G-7 downturn. As
Figure 2 shows, in Mexico in 1995 and in Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea
in 1998, GDP contracted by 6 to 8 percent. These declines were somewhat
greater than the output shocks experienced in Argentina, Brazil, and
Mexico more than once during the 1980s. Indonesia’s experience—output
dropped 15 percent in 1998—is unique in Asia but is comparable to
Chile’s 1982 downturn. Further, because the Asian countries had been
enjoying a steady diet of very rapid real GDP growth ranging from 6 to
10 percent a year, the cost in terms of deviation from trend was more than
double the year-to-year decline.2
In addition, although output often resumes growing within a year of
1 The index, based on Caprio and Klingebiel (1996), Frankel and Rose (1996), and
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1997), deﬁnes crisis to include unsuccessful speculative attacks as
well as large devaluations.
2 A World Bank study reports an average drop in output growth of 5 percentage points
after a banking crisis while an IMF study found that the cost of emerging market crises in
terms of deviation from trend averaged 14.6 percent of GDP (World Bank 1998, page 126).
WHY THE INTEREST IN REFORM? 43the start of a crisis, the long-term costs can be signiﬁcant. For instance,
currency/banking crises usually expose/worsen large restructuring costs
and transfer them to the public sector; such costs have equaled 10 to 30
percent of GDP in emerging markets (IMF 1998a). Further, the downturn
is likely to raise poverty rates and income inequality, with possible
adverse effects on nutrition and primary school enrollments.3 Beyond the
costs to the devaluing countries, in the spring of 1998, world growth for
1998 and 1999 was forecast to fall to its slowest two-year pace since the
recessions of 1990–91 and 1981–82—largely because of the collapse in
Asia, to judge from IMF projections.4 In addition, 1998 saw the ﬁrst
signiﬁcant slowdown in world output growth since the oil shocks of the
1970s that did not result from policy initiatives in the G-7. Following
Russia’s default, moreover, G-7 ﬁnancial markets brieﬂy faced serious
3 Indeed, World Bank staff estimates that the current crises could easily return East
Asian poverty rates to their level at the start of the 1990s (World Bank 1998).
4 In May 1997, just before the Thai devaluation, the IMF expected world output to grow
4.4 percent in 1998, almost 2 percentage points above the actual outcome. In Latin America
and the industrial countries, growth was 2 percentage points and 0.5 percentage point
below original projections. Now, in the fall of 1999, it appears that the 1998–99 slowdown
in world growth was actually the mildest of four such slowdowns to occur in the past three
decades.
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shortest-term U.S. and German government securities. This episode
riveted ofﬁcials’ attention and spurred a series of interest rate cuts
throughout the G-7.
Finally, as suggested by the stability of pre-crisis interest-rate
spreads, the depth and breadth of the 1997–99 crisis were not generally
expected. Because this turmoil involved “miracle” countries admired for
their exemplary policies, many observers were startled into noting that
crises are inherently unpredictable. Some also sensed that the punish-
ment exceeded any possible crime. Real trade-weighted devaluations of
30 to 40 percent, year over year, in Korea and Thailand matched the
largest declines in Latin America in the 1980s and in Mexico in 1994–95
and were much larger than Europe’s real devaluations in 1992.5 The real
decline in the rupiah was even greater.6 While some analysts argue that
several of the East Asian currencies were overvalued, these precipitous
declines far exceeded the estimated misalignments.
WHY NOW?T HE GLOBAL SETTING
Many countries now confront a global environment reminiscent of
that seen in the ﬁrst quarter of this century. Early in that period,
unfettered capital ﬂows and adherence to the gold standard were the
norm. But after World War I, even as many states struggled to restore the
gold standard, the consensus on the rules and object of the economic
game had evaporated (Eichengreen 1992). Labor had acquired a new
political role and new expectations regarding the state’s ability to affect
employment and growth. Thus emerged the economic “trilemma”—the
incompatibility of ﬁxed exchange rates, free capital markets, and a desire
for independent monetary policy focused on domestic goals. (Two of the
three might be attainable, but the three together are not.) The result was
increased ﬁnancial turmoil.
Now, once again, many countries are facing the same trilemma.
Although the share of countries with somewhat ﬂexible regimes is
growing, three-quarters still target exchange rates in a world where
investors know that currency pegs rarely last beyond ﬁve years.7 In
5 The real, trade-weighted U.S. dollar fell 30 percent from its 1985 peak to its 1988
trough, but the slide took three-plus years, and the annual decline never exceeded 13
percent. Similarly, the real, trade-weighted yen fell 34 percent from April 1995 to August
1998, with a maximum year-to-year decline of 20 percent.
6 Nominal devaluations against the U.S. dollar, pre-crisis peak to trough, were also
unprecedented. For the baht, ringgit, won, and rupiah, they ranged from 46 to 81 percent.
7 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995). IMF data indicate that 65 percent of members now
embrace some form of ﬂexibility, up from 25 percent in 1980; but the share limiting,
managing, or pegging the exchange rate is still 75 percent (IMF, Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions, 1981 and 1998).
WHY THE INTEREST IN REFORM? 47addition, in much of Latin America and Asia, where democracy is new,
recently enfranchised workers and opposition leaders may not share the
government’s priorities.8 Against this background, the world has recently
become as integrated as it was in the early 1900s, in terms of both trade
and capital ﬂows.9 This increased integration reﬂects a key point that
deserves emphasis: Globally, the shift toward free capital markets is very
new. While the United States, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom
began liberalizing their capital accounts in the mid to late 1970s, most of
Europe and the developing world did not follow suit until the 1990s
(Obstfeld and Taylor 1997).10 Thus, many developing countries have just
begun to face the full force of the trilemma within the last few years.
SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS VERSUS POLICY MISTAKES
Some observers dismiss the need for reform by emphasizing that
crises represent inevitable and instructive adjustments to periodic excess.
True, but as the industrial countries have developed better macro policies
and tools, postwar downturns have generally turned mild and infrequent
compared with those before World War II. While ﬁnancial crises may
have had a serious impact on speciﬁc regions or sectors, they usually
have not led to widespread panics or national contractions. If the
industrial countries have learned to moderate the impact of “corrections”
via better institutions and policies, the same approach might also apply
globally.
But to justify reforming the international monetary system, the
system must have been ill suited to deal with recent ﬁnancial crises. If
crises are simply the outcome of national policy mistakes, systemic
reform might not be warranted. Unfortunately, especially in small, open
economies, deﬁning “good” policy—in choosing a currency regime, for
example—can be very difﬁcult, as will be discussed further below.
In principle, the system could make matters worse in several
ways—by providing perverse incentives, for instance. Indeed, some
observers argue that international rescue packages create moral hazard
8 Argentina returned to democracy in late 1983; in Chile, the Pinochet dictatorship
ended in 1988; in Mexico, the PRI has won every presidential election since 1929 although
the opposition now controls the lower house of the congress. In Korea, Kim Dae Jung is the
ﬁrst head of state from an opposition party since 1948. President Suharto governed
Indonesia from 1965 to 1998.
9 See Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) and Bordo, Eichengreen, and Kim (1998). The latter
present data showing that the volatility of capital ﬂows to the emerging markets from 1971
to 1997 was similar to that seen in the industrial countries from 1919 to 1929 (their Tables
1 and 2). They also note the vastly increased diversity of borrowers and lenders in recent
years.
10 Bartolini and Drazen (1996) and Bacchetta and van Wincoop (1998) also show a sharp
decline in capital controls in developing countries in the 1990s. Although some LDCs moved
toward capital account liberalization in the 1970s, many reinstated these barriers during the
debt crisis of the 1980s.
48 Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. Oliveiand were a primary cause of the Asian crisis (Schwartz 1998). Alterna-
tively, the lack of an effective global lender of last resort may exacerbate
investors’ fears and thus increase the probability of international bank
runs. Moreover, if “system” is deﬁned to include the goals of the
international community as expressed in international agreements, prof-
fered advice, or generally accepted “norms,” the system may encourage
policies that do not mesh with today’s economic realities. For example,
are national currencies an anachronism—at least for small open econo-
mies? The European Monetary Union has clearly put this question on the
table. After reviewing the “facts” of the Asian crisis, thus, the paper will
resume exploring how the system may have worsened observed out-
comes.
THE “FACTS” OF THE ASIAN CRISIS:AB RIEF REVIEW
Economists have already written volumes on the Asian crises,
creating a literature this paper will not review.11 To provide a basis for
further discussion, however, this section will posit a few “facts” that most
analysts would probably accept, possibly grudgingly. First, most observ-
ers would likely agree that the Asian countries in crisis exhibited some
fundamental problems that increased their vulnerability. To be sure,
these problems were not the usual suspects, the unsustainable ﬁscal or
current account deﬁcits blamed for most previous LDC crises. Indeed, as
shown in Table 1, rapid real growth, low inﬂation, and recorded ﬁscal
surpluses reinforced the perception that Asian macro policies were
exemplary. Of course, banking system losses often lead to ﬁscal deﬁcits ex
post. Moreover, in several countries, sizable current account deﬁcits were
causing concern, but these imbalances were generally thought to be
sustainable.12
By contrast, ﬁnancial indicators were less favorable. With low
interest rates in many industrial countries and high domestic rates in
Asia, private capital ﬂows to the troubled Asians almost tripled from $24
billion in 1990 to $62 billion in 1996 (Figure 3). Appendix Figure 1 shows
ﬂows for additional areas. Net portfolio ﬂows soared and “other” (largely
bank) loans roughly doubled. With direct investment remaining rela-
tively modest, volatile bank loans played an unusually large role in
capital ﬂows to Asia. As a result, in late 1996 most troubled Asians had
outstanding liabilities to foreign banks that were large in terms of GDP or
11 These studies include, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998a and 1998b),
Radelet and Sachs (1998a), and World Bank (1998). The analysts fall into three camps that
stress, respectively, fundamental problems, multiple equilibria in asset markets, and moral
hazard. Each group provides valuable perspectives on a highly complex “truth.”
12 In 1996, Thailand, Malaysia, and Korea had current account deﬁcits above 4 percent
of GDP, the level some observers consider the upper boundary for sustainability. In
Thailand, the ratio was 8 percent.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































50 Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. OliveiWHY THE INTEREST IN REFORM? 51foreign currency reserves (Table 2). Much of this debt was due within one
year and denominated in unhedged foreign currencies. These capital
ﬂows led to rapid credit growth that ﬁnanced high, possibly overopti-
mistic, levels of investment,13 given these countries’ growing economic
maturity and weakened competitive positions.14 Consumer prices were
generally well behaved, but ﬁnancial asset prices were soaring, despite
falling corporate proﬁtability, as some foreign capital ﬂowed, often with
government guidance, into vacant real estate and unneeded industrial
capacity. With hindsight, thus, most observers would probably grant the
following: Banking supervision was weak; ﬁnancial market deregulation
and capital account liberalization, which often foster increased risk-
taking, were recent; accounting practices limited transparency; directed
lending was prominent; and, in some cases, banks and other ﬁrms were
highly levered. And many borrowers may have assumed an explicit or
implicit government guarantee.15
That these countries suffered twin banking and currency crises—
everyone agrees. As asset prices collapsed, the ﬁve most troubled Asian
economies experienced an abrupt $80 billion reversal in capital ﬂows and
a nominal devaluation against the U.S. dollar that ranged from 46 percent
to 81 percent. Capital inﬂows of $62 billion in 1996 became outﬂows of
$20 billion in 1997. The largest reversals occurred in “other” (mostly
bank) ﬂows that left many banks in greatly weakened condition. Unre-
corded outﬂows also surged as domestic residents and foreigners scram-
bled to cover unhedged positions.
Given feedback and multiplier effects, twin crises are more severe in
terms of lost output and length than a banking or currency crisis alone.16
When domestic banks have large net liabilities to foreigners denominated
in foreign currencies, a major devaluation threatens their liquidity, even
their solvency. Banking problems then reverberate through the economy
as banks call loans and cut lending. Causality runs both ways; just as
currency weakness creates a liquidity problem for the banks, a dollar
liquidity problem in the banking system worsens a currency crisis. The
adverse impact on output is worse when banks are the major source of
credit, as tends to be the case in developing countries.
13 In Malaysia, Korea, and Thailand, the ratio of gross ﬁxed capital formation to GDP
had actually risen since the late 1980s to about 40 percent of GDP. In the OECD, the ratio
has been close to 20 percent for years. See Browne, Hellerstein, and Little (1998), and IMF
(1998b, pp. 85–86).
14 China is becoming an increasingly formidable competitor for export markets and
direct investment funds, while NAFTA has improved Mexico’s competitiveness in the same
areas. Further, starting in May 1995, the yen fell from unusually high levels against the U.S.
dollar to unusually low levels in 1997 and 1998. With their dollar pegs, the troubled Asians
ﬁrst gained, then lost competitiveness vis-a `-vis Japan.
15 Standard & Poor’s counts banking sector liabilities as contingent government
liabilities (Bisignano 1999).
16 See IMF (1998a).





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































WHY THE INTEREST IN REFORM? 53Failure to distinguish between currency crises that are and are not
linked to a banking crisis may partly explain why some observers at ﬁrst
underestimated the declines in output that followed Asia’s devaluations.
After all, in 1992–1993, several European countries devalued by 10 to 20
percent, in real, trade-weighted terms, without the devastating conse-
quences seen in Asia. And the improved competitiveness that accompa-
nied the U.S. dollar’s 30 percent slide from 1985 to 1988 was widely
viewed as contributing to buoyant conditions late in the decade. But
among other differences, (most) European banking systems were likely
much less exposed to a devaluation than were the Asian banks. One
ﬂawed but suggestive measure of this exposure is net foreign-currency
liabilities to foreigners as a share of the banking system’s total liabilities
(Table 3).17 In mid 1992, this share was inconsequential in the United
17 This measure ignores off-balance-sheet hedging activity. It also discounts foreign-
currency claims on domestic nonbanks, since devaluation would undermine the viability of
Table 3
Banking System Liabilities to Foreigners
Net foreign currency liabilities to foreigners








Net liabilities to foreigners
a as a share of











a Currency breakdowns are not available; we assume that the bulk of the liabilities were denominated in foreign
currency.
Note: Portugal was also among the countries which devalued during the 1992–93 ERM crisis, but the data on
currency breakdown are not available.
Source:BankforInternationalSettlements,InternationalBankingandFinancialMarketDevelopmentsandIMF,
International Financial Statistics.
54 Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. OliveiStates and the United Kingdom; but in Sweden more than 20 percent of
total bank liabilities were potentially exposed to the devaluation that
further weakened a banking sector already suffering from a real estate
collapse. Sweden’s GDP fell by 2.2 percent in 1993, Western Europe’s
worst performance. The Swedish banks’ exposure in 1992 was similar to
Korea’s in 1996 (assuming most external liabilities were denominated in
foreign currencies); the Thai and Indonesian banking systems looked
even more vulnerable.
Because Europe’s banking systems were less vulnerable to depreci-
ation and European central banks probably had more credibility in
controlling inﬂation, the Europeans were able to cut interest rates soon
after their devaluations. By contrast, the Asians kept rates very high for
longer—despite the harm to highly leveraged ﬁrms and output—to
stabilize the exchange rate and keep inﬂation from eroding competitive
gains.
Most analysts also assign an important role to spillover effects or,
sometimes, “contagion.” Arguably, the Thai phase of the crisis was not
totally unexpected. Still, when the Thais devalued, virtually no one
thought that most of Asean would follow suit within six weeks as
investors reassessed the quality of their loans and the credibility of the
exchange rate pegs. Given the speed of the reaction and Thailand’s small
size even within developing Asia, the spillovers seemingly reﬂected
changes in perceptions of fundamentals more than changes in the funda-
mentals per se.
Thereafter, as net exports to the devaluing countries declined,
commodity prices fell to their lowest levels in decades. Exchange rates in
commodity-producing countries generally weakened and, as interest
rates on LDC debt rose, ﬁscal struggles worsened. Spillovers also traveled
via the ﬁnancial markets as investors chose or were required (by falling
credit ratings, say) to reallocate their assets. With the Japanese banks
known to have an above-average exposure to Southeast Asia, the
devaluations triggered renewed concerns about these banks’ solvency,
aggravating Japan’s severe downturn.
Investor concerns about the emerging markets spiked sharply in late
1997 and then again in July–August 1998, judging by the spreads between
interest rates on Brady-type bonds and U.S. Treasury securities (Figure
4).18 The ﬁrst episode accompanied a speculative attack on Hong Kong’s
currency peg and a deterioration in Korea’s ﬁnancial situation. It also
provided the ﬁrst evidence that the crisis might be spreading to Latin
these assets. See Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998) for discussion of the role of foreign-
currency debt in the Nordic banking crisis. The Bank for International Settlements gives
data on the currency composition of banks’ external assets and liabilities for BIS-reporting
countries but not for emerging markets.
18 Synchronous shifts in stock prices and domestic interest rates also occurred. See IMF
(1999, chapter III).
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volved all emerging markets. Since nuclear Russia had been considered
too important politically to be allowed to fail, the Russian devaluation
was a shock signaling a change in the rules of the game for multilateral
rescues. Still, these spreads soon retraced a portion of their steep climbs,
suggesting once again that investor perceptions were changing more
abruptly than the fundamentals.
Do the above developments represent contagion? The answer matters
because evidence of contagion may imply a need for reform. While many
analysts have noted that currency crises tend to be clustered in time and
space,19 the concept of contagion has begun to sharpen. Masson (1998)
carefully distinguishes three reasons for the contemporaneous nature of
crises and calls only one “contagion.” He labels common shocks (like a
rise in U.S. interest rates) “monsoonal.” Changes in fundamentals in one
country (relative competitiveness, say) caused by a crisis in another are
“spillover effects.” And explanations not linked to changes in macro
fundamentals or common shocks—shifts in market sentiment or in the
interpretation of existing information, for instance—he calls “contagion.”
This concept involves self-fulﬁlling expectations, with ﬁnancial markets
subject to multiple equilibria for a given set of national fundamentals.
Other analysts include liquidity shocks to lenders or the reduced political
cost of a cluster of devaluations in the concept. Efforts to identify
contagion usually look for increased cross-country correlation in the
prices of ﬁnancial assets during a crisis.
To date, the evidence suggests a role for contagion. Masson (1998)
concludes that common exogenous shocks and fundamentals cannot
explain the coincidence of LDC crises but that the values of key
fundamentals in many (not all) afﬂicted countries were consistent with
the existence of multiple equilibria that left them exposed to contagion.
Comparing cross-country correlations in crisis and non-crisis periods,
Baig and Goldfajn (1998) also see signs of contagion in currency, equity,
and debt markets in the East Asian crises. But these authors admittedly
cannot distinguish between herd behavior and a “wake-up call” effect. By
contrast, Fernandez, Hausmann, and Rigobon (1998) ﬁnd no clear evi-
dence of contagion in bond or stock markets during a crisis once they
assume and correct for larger variances in the underlying fundamentals
in troubled times. Instead, they report “excessive” co-movement in
emerging market asset prices at all times, an excess that leaves these
countries vulnerable to shocks emanating from other emerging markets.
They urge further research to identify the source of the vulnerability.
Observers also report some evidence of herd behavior and over-
shooting. For example, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1998) ﬁnd positive feedback
trading and herding by foreign investors in the Korean stock market in
19 See Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Glick and Rose (1998).
WHY THE INTEREST IN REFORM? 57the months leading to the crisis. Turning to the currency markets, some
analysts have suggested that Asian and Brazilian exchange rates were
overvalued by as much as 30 percent. But the evidence is mixed. Figure
5 plots real trade-weighted exchange rates for the currencies in question.
These graphs show that, pre-crisis, most of these currencies were close to
their average levels since 1970 or 1990. Menzie Chinn (1998) has exam-
ined the question of overvaluation more carefully for the Asian countries.
Using a PPP approach, with producer prices,20 he ﬁnds that in May 1997
the ringgit, peso, and baht were overvalued by 7 to 19 percent, while the
won, rupiah, and Singapore dollar were undervalued. Alternatively,
using a monetary model with a proxy for productivity trends, he
concludes that the ringgit, rupiah, and baht were very modestly overval-
ued while the won and the peso were undervalued. Yet these currencies
fell by as much as 40 and 60 percent. Recently, moreover, these currencies
have appreciated—in some cases to roughly their pre-crisis levels. Only
in Indonesia does a surge in inﬂation account for most of the apprecia-
tion. The overshooting will eventually attract foreign investment but can
also do irreparable damage, to the extent that it reﬂects the existence of
multiple equilibria or panic.21 By the time the currency nears its original
level, many needless bankruptcies may have occurred.
In sum, this review of the “facts” suggests that policy ﬂaws made the
devaluing countries vulnerable to liquidity and currency pressures.
Trade and ﬁnancial links and abrupt shifts in investor perceptions then
spread and intensiﬁed the original shocks. Indeed, the volatile, correlated
behavior of asset prices suggests that herd behavior may have played a
role both before and after the crisis.
THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
How, then, might the current system have aggravated the crisis? To
start with the problem of overborrowing/lending, did systemic condi-
tions spur excessive risk-taking? Why, for instance, did lenders not
perform adequate due diligence? Monsoonal factors, like the unusually
competitive conditions in world capital markets (factors clearly exoge-
nous to individual emerging markets) may have played a role. The Bank
for International Settlements (BIS), in particular, has expressed concern
about the marked expansion in global liquidity that led to atypically low
real interest rates in G-7 countries, a search for yields, compressed
20 Chinn (1998) ﬁnds trend stationarity of the PPI-deﬂated, but not the CPI-deﬂated,
real exchange rate.
21 Moreover, signiﬁcant capital inﬂows usually do not resume until the currency has
stabilized.
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countries, high domestic interest rates reﬂected the struggle to ﬁght the
inﬂationary impact of big capital inﬂows, given the currency pegs. As a
result of these policy differences, to give just one example, yields on baht
investments funded by depreciating yen loans exceeded 35 percent in
early 1997 (IMF 1998c). To many analysts, abandoning the currency peg
offered an obvious solution to the Asians’ plight. But, with large capital
inﬂows, the likely nominal appreciation might have aggravated already
troubling asset price inﬂation, creating a vicious spiral (Furman and
Stiglitz 1998). And countries that increased exchange rate ﬂexibility once
investors scented currency weakness usually triggered unexpectedly
large “bungled depreciations.”
In addition, if previous international rescues led investors to believe
that taxpayers in the devaluing countries would bear the ultimate cost of
these crises, then the system may have created perverse incentives. Critics
point in particular to the precedent set by the Mexican loan program.23
On the other hand, the IMF currently faces handicaps as an international
lender of last resort (ILLR) since it cannot lend quickly and reliably. As a
multilateral organization with limited funds, the IMF must obtain mem-
ber support and at least some demonstration of borrower adherence to
difﬁcult macro and micro conditions in every rescue—hardly a sure bet.24
Many rescues occur after a forced devaluation, and preemptive efforts
usually do not work. Thus, the absence of a reliable ILLR may have
increased the volatility of investor sentiment, aggravating herd behavior.
In sum, current international arrangements may have worsened
recent crises in several ways. First, once capital transactions are liberal-
ized, as widely encouraged, small, open economies have limited policy
independence under ﬁxed or ﬂexible exchange rate regimes (Cooper 1984;
Furman and Stiglitz 1998; Hausmann et al. 1999). But capital controls,
which may offer protection from volatile capital ﬂows, raise the cost of
investment funds, an undesirable outcome in the long run. Further, while
it is not clear whether the existence of an ILLR that increases moral
hazard or the absence of an effective ILLR that worsens volatility poses
the bigger problem, multilateral rescues clearly raise difﬁcult issues.
Finally, while external factors, like conditions in global capital markets or
a neighbor’s policy mistakes, clearly create harmful spillovers, opportu-
nities for meaningful policy coordination are currently limited. The rest of
22 In Europe, EMU candidates were pursuing tight ﬁscal policies to meet convergence
criteria and relied on generous monetary policy and soft exchange rates to buoy demand. In
Japan, the unresolved banking crisis and sluggish, then declining, growth required
ever-lower interest rates.
23 The rescue, in turn, may have encouraged the Mexican government’s willingness to
assume a large share of the banking system’s losses.
24 As will be discussed below, the problem is not with conditionality per se (condition-
ality is essential) but rather with the conditions now imposed, since they may not
correspond with lender-of-last resort functions.
WHY THE INTEREST IN REFORM? 61the paper will explore these issues and their implications for systemic
change.
DILEMMAS IN CHOOSING A CURRENCY REGIME
The issue of optimum currency areas and, more broadly, the choice
of an exchange rate regime is considered the central intellectual question
in international ﬁnance. Nevertheless, current economic models of the
international economy are still inadequate for answering the most
pressing questions that policymakers face in dealing with this issue. For
example, economists lack models general enough to assess with much
conﬁdence the efﬁciency gains that a country might reap from joining a
currency union. As Krugman (1995) points out, there is no consensus on
the likely size of the costs associated with ﬂuctuations in units of account,
or on the barriers that such shifts raise to international trade and
investment.
The question of the beneﬁts of ﬁxed versus ﬂexible exchange rates is
usually cast as a trade-off between macroeconomic ﬂexibility and micro-
economic efﬁciency. In the case of micro efﬁciency, a ﬁxed exchange rate
reduces both transaction costs and exchange rate risk, which can discour-
age trade and investment. While markets for hedging short-term volatil-
ity exist, hedging against long-term real exchange rate misalignments is
either very costly or totally impossible.
Despite widespread recognition of such volatility costs, the theoret-
ical and empirical bases for economists’ beliefs about the efﬁciency gains
from ﬁxed rates remain elusive. Recent advances in micro-founded
modeling of exchange rate dynamics suggest that the welfare losses due
to exchange rate volatility can be substantial, on the order of a full
percentage point of annual GDP (compare Obstfeld and Rogoff 1998).25
The few empirical studies on the allocative gains from currency uniﬁca-
tion point to potentially large beneﬁts, even when the savings come from
the elimination of currency conversion costs alone.26 Of course, it is likely
that recent advances in information and communication technology will
25 While this estimate is derived in the context of a general equilibrium model in which
monetary disturbances are the only sources of shocks, it is still a very surprising number,
given the assumption of a low degree of risk aversion. Obstfeld and Rogoff’s estimate is just
illustrative of the potential applications of their model, and more work is needed to extend
their framework and assess the robustness of their welfare computations. Their contribution
is mentioned here in the context of the microeconomic efﬁciency gains of exchange rate
stability, but their model provides an integrated framework for analyzing both the micro
and the macro issues associated with the choice of an exchange rate regime. As such, it gives
a new perspective to a debate that so far has treated the two issues separately.
26 A Commission of the European Communities (1990) calculation shows that the
savings from eliminating currency conversion costs could be as high as 0.4 percent of EU
GDP.
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therefore one should interpret transaction-costs-based estimates with
great caution. In addition, the sizable literature on the effects of exchange
rate volatility on trade ﬂows usually ﬁnds small adverse effects, if any.
However, Obstfeld (1997) notes that recent work analyzing international
departures from the law of one price seems to suggest that exchange rate
volatility does indeed inhibit trade ﬂows (see, for example, Obstfeld and
Taylor 1997). Overall, despite the signiﬁcant promise of recent theoretical
advances, the microeconomic efﬁciency side of the trade-off involved in
the choice of an exchange rate regime still remains largely unexplored,
both from a theoretical and from an empirical standpoint.
In contrast, the macroeconomic ﬂexibility side of the trade-off has
been analyzed in much more depth, at least from a theoretical perspec-
tive. Economists usually summarize the advantages of a ﬂexible exchange
rate regime by stating that a ﬂexible rate gives a country the option to
pursue an independent monetary policy. The value of this option
depends crucially on the type of disturbances the country faces. The
“stabilization approach,” conceived over 20 years ago, contends that if
the choice between ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rates is framed in terms of
output stability, then a country is better off with a ﬁxed exchange rate
only when money demand shocks (that is, velocity shocks) are the
predominant source of disturbances. If, instead, terms of trade shocks or
shocks to the demand for domestic goods are very important, a ﬂexible
exchange rate gives the monetary authority an additional degree of
freedom that makes economic management more protective of the level
of domestic activity.27
Of course, practical implementation of the “stabilization approach”
is difﬁcult, since it can be hard to assess the current and future relative
importance of the different shocks that affect an economy. Moreover,
ﬁxing the exchange rate is complicated by the persisting volatility among
major currencies: If a small economy ﬁxes its exchange rate against the
U.S. dollar, it will still experience swings against the Japanese yen. In the
context of the East Asian ﬁnancial crisis, this problem led to serious
adverse macroeconomic effects.28
27 For example, if a country suffers a permanent fall in the demand for its exports and
maintains a ﬁxed exchange rate, output and employment will decline. The reason is that
prices and wages are sticky: If they were fully ﬂexible, they would immediately drop to
restore the initial level of output and employment. In practice, this adjustment occurs
slowly, with adverse welfare effects. A discrete nominal devaluation of the exchange rate
would achieve the necessary reduction in the terms of trade, while restoring output at full
employment much more quickly (compare Obstfeld 1998b).
28 Ideally, pegging to a basket of major currencies should shield a country from
unwanted exchange rate volatility, but in practice this solution has not been adopted very
often, most likely because it can prove difﬁcult for the public to interpret the monetary
authority’s policy stance when the basket’s weights are kept secret and are subject to
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has stressed that ﬁxed exchange rates may bring credibility effects that
improve the inﬂation–unemployment trade-off.29 According to this view,
a country with a propensity to inﬂationary policies is better-off pegging
its currency to a more disciplined country, thus establishing anti-inﬂation
credibility. For example, many European countries have been able to
reduce their inﬂation rates by importing monetary discipline from the
Bundesbank. However, pegging the exchange rate for credibility pur-
poses appears to be, at best, a temporary device. As the European
Monetary System breakup of 1992 suggests, as soon as inﬂation is
upstaged by recession as the main priority, the freedom in monetary
policy brought by ﬂexible exchange rates again becomes signiﬁcant.
(Compare Krugman 1995.)
The experience with exchange rate-based stabilizations in develop-
ing countries also points to the need to abandon a ﬁxed parity once wage
and price inﬂation have slowed. The reason is that exchange rate-based
stabilizations contribute to an overvalued real exchange rate,30 and thus
to trade and current account imbalances. While a country’s external
balance could in principle be restored through a fall in the price of
nontraded goods, the correction in the real exchange rate usually comes
through a nominal devaluation. (Compare Goldfajn and Valde ￿s 1999.)31
As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) show, only a handful of countries with
open capital markets have been able to sustain a peg for more than ﬁve
years, a record leaving little doubt that it is very difﬁcult to maintain ﬁxed
exchange rates in the face of free capital movements. While one could
argue that a ﬁxed but adjustable peg is still useful for reducing currency
volatility, the Mexican collapse of 1994 and the recent East Asian debt
crises have reinforced some lessons concerning the risks of unilateral
pegs. The depletion of reserves that usually accompanies an unsuccessful
defense of an exchange rate peg impairs a central bank’s lender of last
resort functions, particularly so when the peg encouraged banks to take
frequent changes over time, as has often been the case. For a more in-depth discussion of
these issues, compare Frankel (1999), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), and Rogoff (1998a, 1998b).
29 The argument is usually grounded in a rational expectations framework in which
monetary policy has at best a very short-lived real effect, and it therefore tends to downplay
the role of an independent monetary policy for stabilization purposes.
30 The causes for a real exchange rate appreciation can be found in the backward
indexation of wage contracts, and in the consumption boom that characterizes the early
stages of the stabilization program. The consumption boom bids up the relative price of
nontraded goods, the price of traded goods being tied by the law of one price (compare
Calvo and Ve ￿gh 1999).
31 Calvo and Ve ￿gh (1999) note that of all major stabilization programs, the Argentine
1991 Convertibility Plan is so far the only program that has maintained the exchange rate at
the level chosen at its inception. Eight of the twelve major stabilization programs listed in
Table 1 of Calvo and Ve ￿gh have ended in full-blown crises with large losses of international
reserves.
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ballooning of a country’s debt position and the vulnerability of the
ﬁnancial sector associated with the devaluation and the loss of reserves
can then spur a rapid and ferocious withdrawal of credits by foreign
investors. The demise of the exchange rate peg can thus precipitate a
creditors’ panic, and the resulting collapse in bank lending can have
devastating effects on the level of real economic activity.
Of course, there is no presumption that a currency crisis must
necessarily end in a broad ﬁnancial debacle. For example, with the
possible exception of Sweden, the EMS speculative attacks in the early
1990s were not generally associated with banking crises.32 But the
preconditions necessary for minimizing such a risk, namely that the
central bank not incur huge capital losses in the failed defense of the peg,
and that foreign exchange liabilities in the ﬁnancial sector be properly
hedged, can be difﬁcult to meet in practice. In this respect, Rogoff (1998a)
notes that it is hard for a central bank to know when to abandon the
defense of its currency, since it cannot simply fold every time speculators
test the peg, and that a ﬁxed exchange rate can reduce market partici-
pants’ awareness of exchange rate risks, the more so if supervision and
regulation are weak.
The potentially high output costs of a currency crisis have led many
observers to conclude that in a world of highly mobile capital, the scope
for ﬁxed but adjustable exchange rate arrangements is shrinking rapidly:
A country should either let its exchange rate ﬂoat freely or engage in a
truly ﬁxed arrangement, such as a currency union (with currency boards,
a somewhat weaker arrangement, as the alternative). But this prescription
still leaves a country with the task of assessing the trade-off between
microeconomic efﬁciency and macroeconomic ﬂexibility. As mentioned,
exchange rate volatility is costly, and small developing countries are
likely to have very thin ﬁnancial markets where small volumes can
generate large swings in the currency’s price. Moreover, given that a
developing country’s foreign debt is often short-term and denominated
in hard currency, full ﬂotation can cause large ﬂuctuations in the
country’s debt position. A pure ﬂoat in the presence of large capital
inﬂows can also be problematic: A large appreciation may distort the
economy by adversely affecting the export sector, the engine for growth
32 Also, one could argue that the speculative attack on the East Asian currencies only
accelerated a debt crisis that would have occurred in any event because of fundamental
solvency problems in these countries, regardless of the exchange rate regime. In addition,
given that some of the East Asian countries hit by the crisis do not appear to have suffered
from a real exchange rate overvaluation, the pressure on the currency may have been the
direct result of the massive capital outﬂow caused by the creditors’ loss of conﬁdence in the
countries’ creditworthiness (compare Feldstein 1999).
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would have a signiﬁcant weight in the monetary authority’s objective
function, and that in the end the ﬂoat would be “managed.” Indeed,
Hausmann et al. (1999) contend that the Latin American experience
shows that countries that formally ﬂoat (or have wide bands) tend to use
exchange rate ﬂexibility very sparingly, and that monetary policy in these
countries does not stabilize the level of output.
At the other end of the spectrum from ﬂexible exchange rates, the
launch of the European Monetary Union has rekindled proposals for a
more widespread adoption of supranational currencies. Mundell (1961),
McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) have provided the intellectual
framework for the deﬁnition of an optimum currency area: Openness to
trade, labor mobility, symmetry of shocks, and the presence of compen-
sating ﬁscal transfers are the criteria for assessing whether a country
should join a currency area. Despite the clear failure of EMU members to
meet some of these criteria, most notably labor mobility and compensat-
ing ﬁscal transfers, the euro has been introduced in hopes that it will
allow more competition and cross-border transparency among member
countries, thus fostering growth. Since the argument that the union will
eventually evolve to make the single currency adequate for all is,
according to many observers, largely based on a leap of faith, EMU’s
future prospects remain highly uncertain.34
Nevertheless, many observers have suggested that several develop-
ing countries, especially in Central Europe and Latin America, should
also relinquish their monetary sovereignty and adopt the euro or the U.S.
dollar as their reference currency. Given that these countries are very
unlikely to meet the optimum currency area criteria, the cost-beneﬁt
calculus is by no means clear-cut, even following a ﬁnancial crisis. The
Frankel and Rose (1997) suggestion that a country that does not meet the
optimum currency area criteria ex ante may well meet them ex post
through increased trade and income links needs further exploration. Still,
in addition to the hard-to-quantify efﬁciency gains from a truly ﬁxed
exchange rate, other potential beneﬁts are evident: The commitment not
to devalue would be credible and the exchange rate mismatch character-
izing the balance sheet of ﬁnancial institutions in developing countries
would be greatly reduced.
The small country’s lack of representation on the governing body of
the monetary authority is usually dismissed as a serious drawback to
such arrangements since it is hard to see how small changes in the U.S.
33 A ﬁxed exchange rate also has drawbacks in this circumstance: Efforts to sterilize
capital inﬂows to avoid an increase in prices may be counterproductive to the extent that
they raise domestic interest rates, thus fostering additional inﬂows (compare Reinhart and
Reinhart 1998).
34 Obstfeld (1998b) offers an extensive analysis of the challenges facing EMU.
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America, for example, where monthly movements in dollar-denominated
interest rate spreads on the order of several hundred basis points are the
rule (see Hausmann et al. 1999). However, this argument may not be
compelling once these countries have reached a greater degree of
ﬁnancial and economic development. It is widely thought that macroeco-
nomic ﬂexibility is of little use for small and open economies, where an
exchange rate depreciation is likely to feed quickly into nominal prices
and wages; thus, joining a currency bloc would entail little loss in this
regard. But, as Obstfeld (1998b) remarks, Ireland’s recent experience
shows that the exchange rate can be a useful adjustment tool even for a
small open economy. Ireland let the punt appreciate sharply between
1995 and 1998, and requested a 3 percent revaluation of the punt’s central
rate within the Exchange Rate Mechanism in March 1998, to help restrain
the remarkable output expansion and relieve inﬂationary pressures. The
move was helpful in allowing Ireland a smooth entry into EMU, and it
shows the value of a nominal currency realignment for adjusting quickly
to asymmetric shocks.35 If situations like that in Ireland are going to occur
often in the future, a currency union is certainly ill-suited to deal with
them.
In summary, in a world of highly mobile capital markets, ﬁxed but
adjustable pegs are unlikely to be sustainable. And the possibility that a
currency collapse will trigger a broad ﬁnancial crisis cannot be ruled out
in countries where banks and the private sector have unhedged foreign
currency liabilities, and where foreign debt is high enough to threaten a
creditors’ panic. But what is the best viable alternative? Should a country
ﬂoat or engage in a truly ﬁxed exchange rate arrangement? The answer
largely depends on how one views the trade-off between macroeconomic
ﬂexibility and microeconomic efﬁciency. Empirical studies on the relative
performance of ﬁxed versus ﬂexible exchange rate regimes generally fail
to ﬁnd any systematic evidence in favor of a speciﬁc regime, at least when
performance is deﬁned in terms of output growth.36 Since the trade-offs
often appear to be genuine, one should beware of generalizations. While
it is possible that at this stage Latin America, with its already high degree
of dollarization, has more to gain than to lose from truly ﬁxed exchange
rate arrangements (see Calvo 1999), it is far from clear that this is the case
35 Obstfeld (1998b) notes that “in principle ﬁscal policy could have been used to slow
consumption growth and cool the economy, but in practice major ﬁscal tools were
unavailable. Government outlays were already being cut as rapidly as was politically
feasible, whereas income tax increases, often an easier route politically, would have violated
the terms of the wage pact and sparked increased wage demands” (p. 18).
36 Compare, for example, Ghosh, Gulde, Ostry, and Wolf (1997). This study, which
analyzes 140 countries over the period 1960 to 1990, shows that ﬁxed exchange rates deliver
lower inﬂation. The result, however, does not seem to be robust to the introduction of more
recent years in the sample (see Caramazza and Aziz 1998).
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depends, among many other things, on the type of shocks it experiences,
on the ﬂexibility of its prices and wages, on the credibility of its monetary
and ﬁscal authorities, and on its openness vis-a `-vis the rest of the world.
Even when all these factors are taken into account, the choice remains a
difﬁcult one, and at this stage it remains highly questionable whether
policy advice on this issue is being given on the basis of a sound
analytical framework.
DILEMMAS RELATED TO THE CAPITAL MARKETS
As widely debated as the issue of ﬁxed versus ﬂexible exchange rates
is the issue of whether developing countries should adopt capital controls
for prudential and emergency purposes. The abrupt and massive reversal
in capital ﬂows in Latin America and East Asia shows that in a world of
intensely mobile capital, the economic and social costs of a ﬁnancial crisis
can be extremely high. While Mexico and the East Asian countries were
running sustained current account deﬁcits, some observers have con-
cluded that the crises, rather than the result of bad fundamentals that
turned borrowers insolvent, were precipitated by a creditors’ panic.
A creditors’ panic is not a completely random occurrence: If the
debtor’s fundamentals are sufﬁciently strong, a panic does not occur,
whereas if the debtor is insolvent, the creditors will immediately try to
withdraw their funds. However, fundamentals can take an intermediate
range of values for which a creditors’ panic is a “sunspot” event. The
capital outﬂow that occurs in these circumstances leaves debtor countries
unable to repay short-term debt from the early liquidation of long-term
investments, thus validating the creditors’ decision to withdraw. The
ﬁnancial distress is greatly magniﬁed by the simultaneous currency
collapse that takes place as foreign exchange reserves decline. While
weak fundamentals contribute to the creditors’ withdrawal, such coordi-
nated action is a probabilistic event, absent which the countries’ credit-
worthiness would have not been impaired.37
In practice, it can be hard to ascertain whether a debt run is the
inevitable consequence of solvency problems or the result of an unnec-
essary panic (and the Mexican and East Asian crises are no exceptions in
this regard), but the policy consequences of this distinction are important.
37 See, for example, Radelet and Sachs (1998a) and Chang and Velasco (1998).
According to this interpretation of the ﬁnancial crises in Mexico and East Asia, a creditors’
panic caused a severe macroeconomic crisis in countries that, although not characterized by
entirely strong fundamentals, were in an adequate position to sustain debt servicing on a
reliable basis. In addition, the crisis spread to other countries as investors, wary of their
cross-border exposure, sharply curtailed their positions in several emerging markets,
sending shock waves through the entire international ﬁnancial system.
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of resources: Policy in this case should facilitate the liquidation of assets
and restore sound fundamentals. A panic-driven crisis places unneces-
sary economic and social costs on a country, and policy should therefore
be directed at preventing the panic from happening and, if it occurs, at
alleviating the massive drain of liquidity until calm is restored. (See Calvo
and Fernandez-Arias 1998.)
Capital controls are advocated both as a way of preventing and
managing this latter type of crisis, and as a regulatory remedy to mitigate
excess borrowing in the ﬁrst place, when ﬁnancial regulation is too weak
to address the moral hazard incentives of explicit and implicit govern-
ment guarantees (see McKinnon and Pill 1998). Short-term inﬂows are the
designated target for capital controls, since short-term investment is
widely associated with the disruptive effects of sudden reversals in
market sentiment. Such controls may also be viewed as a way to reduce
asymmetric information problems endemic to ﬁnancial markets, if a
lender’s incentive to monitor a loan is positively related to the duration of
the investment. Moreover, to the extent that banks dominate a country’s
ﬁnancial system and are the main recipients of government guarantees
(in return for being instruments of industrial policy), a second-best
regulatory remedy involving controls on short-term inﬂows might help
address the “overborrowing syndrome.” Proposals for controls on capital
outﬂows during a currency crisis, as a protection against creditors’ panics,
are even more controversial in the ongoing academic and policy debate.
A serious drawback to controlling capital outﬂows, which does not arise
in the case of controls on inﬂows, is that such a measure can create
incentives for rent-seeking and for avoiding or delaying necessary
reforms (compare Eichengreen 1999).
Recent events in East Asia have fueled the debate on the merits of
capital controls, and more speciﬁcally on the advisability of the IMF
commitment to foster “orderly” capital account liberalization among
developing countries.38 Asymmetric information, incomplete contracts,
herd behavior, and contagion effects make the functioning of highly
mobile capital markets problematic, raising the issue as to whether the
beneﬁts of an open capital account are large enough to justify the
potential risks.
Economic theory has long recognized the beneﬁts of open capital
markets. International ﬁnancial transactions allow ﬁrms and households
to diversify away country-speciﬁc risks. They allow countries to ﬁnance
38 In April 1997, the Interim Committee argued that the Articles of Agreement should
be amended to allow the Fund to promote open capital markets, a view reiterated in
September 1997, when Camdessus stated that capital account liberalization should become
one of the goals of the IMF (Camdessus 1998).
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smoothing the time proﬁle of consumption and investment. They channel
savings to their most productive uses, irrespective of location, and they
discipline policymakers, fostering the adoption of sound economic poli-
cies (see Obstfeld 1998a). However, disagreement exists over the potential
magnitude of these gains in actual practice.
As concerns the beneﬁts of international diversiﬁcation, Lucas (1987)
suggests that the welfare gains from international risk-sharing can be
surprisingly small, on the order of a fraction of a percentage point
increase in permanent aggregate consumption.39 In a similar vein, Cole
and Obstfeld (1991) show that, under certain conditions, complete absence
of international asset trade can result in a Pareto-optimal allocation, and,
more generally, that international diversiﬁcation opportunities offer a
limited incremental welfare gain. Subsequent work, however, has quali-
ﬁed these ﬁndings. Obstfeld (1994), for example, argues that a developing
country is likely to beneﬁt greatly from expanded risk-sharing opportu-
nities, because capital market integration allows the country to place a
larger fraction of its wealth in high-expected-return, risky assets that
signiﬁcantly enhance the country’s growth prospects. Far from being
trivial, the gains from international risk-sharing in this case can be
equivalent to an increase in permanent consumption of several percent-
age points. In the end, since the estimates often differ signiﬁcantly with
apparently minor changes in assumptions, it is hard to reach a consensus
on the potential beneﬁts of international diversiﬁcation, but reliance on
Lucas’s computation seems premature at this stage.40
Regarding the beneﬁts of open capital markets arising from an
efﬁcient allocation of resources, both intra and intertemporally, anecdotal
evidence sometimes suggests substantial gains.41 However, systematic
evidence on the beneﬁts of open capital markets to economic perfor-
mance is more limited, if it exists at all. Widely cited is the work by
39 This conclusion stems from the fact that aggregate consumption risk, at least in
OECD countries, is relatively small, and thus the potential welfare gains from the
elimination of aggregate consumption volatility are limited, even in the presence of a
signiﬁcant degree of risk aversion. For example, the standard deviation of per capita
consumption in the U.S. for the post-World War II period is slightly below 2.7 per year,
implying that the total elimination of consumption variability would be worth about a third
of a percent increase in consumption per year to a representative agent, even in the presence
of a coefﬁcient of risk aversion equal to 10. For a thorough discussion of Lucas’s estimate of
the gains from international risk sharing, see Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 5).
40 Still, it seems important to note that most countries hold a large share of their equity
wealth at home (see Tesar and Werner 1995). This could be interpreted as evidence that
utility gains to diversiﬁcation are small.
41 Obstfeld (1998a), for example, notes that “Norway borrowed as much as 14 percent
of gross domestic product in the 1970s to develop its North Sea oil reserves.” Australia and
Canada ran persistent deﬁcits during their periods of settlement and development before
World War I.
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liberalization in a sample that includes both developed and developing
countries. Rodrik notes that the sample contains a number of high-
achievers, but also many under-performers. Bolivia, for example, has
done dismally despite having had an open capital account through most
of the 1980s and 1990s. While Rodrik’s evidence can be criticized on the
grounds that it is hard at this stage to discriminate carefully between
business cycle ﬂuctuations and long-term trends, since many countries
have liberalized only recently, investment rates and macroeconomic
stability remain key determinants for growth, and the results should at
least caution policymakers against buying too readily into open capital
markets.
Despite the fact that a systematic correlation between open capital
accounts and successful economic performance does not jump out from
the data, the view that international capital markets contribute to a
country’s ﬁnancial sector development is widely held. A country may
“import” aspects of a ﬁnancial system through capital inﬂows; for
example, subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks may expand the size
of the national banking system and may also introduce ﬁnancial innova-
tions that increase the scope of ﬁnancial services. The importance of a
deep ﬁnancial system is stressed by the large body of literature that,
starting with Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter (1912), sees the develop-
ment of a country’s ﬁnancial sector as having a signiﬁcant impact on the
level and the rate of growth of its per capita income in the long run. In a
survey of the literature, Levine (1997) concludes that, despite some
qualiﬁcations, most of the theoretical and empirical evidence “suggests a
positive, ﬁrst-order relationship between ﬁnancial development and
economic growth” (p. 688).42
The extent to which the presence of open capital markets is corre-
lated with a country’s ﬁnancial deepness has not been studied exten-
sively. Table 4 presents some cross-sectional evidence relating capital
account liberalization to two widely used indices for ﬁnancial develop-
ment, the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP, and the ratio
of M2 to GDP, for a sample of almost 100 countries, developed and
developing. The indicator of capital account liberalization is the propor-
tion of years from 1980 to 1994 for which a country’s capital account was
free of restrictions,43 and the dependent variable is the difference between
a country’s level of bank credit to the private sector to GDP (or the level
42 Not all economists, however, agree on the importance of ﬁnancial development for
economic growth. For example, according to Lucas (1988), economists “badly over-stress”
the role of ﬁnance, while others argue for reverse causation: Economic growth creates a
demand for new ﬁnancial arrangements, and the ﬁnancial system adapts to these new
demands (Robinson 1952).
43 The IMF’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (various issues) was the
source for this information.
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If capital account liberalization is related to ﬁnancial deepness, the
countries that experienced longer stretches of openness should exhibit
greater increases in the ratio of bank credit to the private sector to GDP
(or M2 to GDP) over the sample period.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 4 show that the estimated coefﬁcient
on capital account liberalization is signiﬁcantly positive for both mea-
sures of ﬁnancial deepness,44 but subsample stability robustness checks
indicate that the results are entirely driven by the industrialized countries
included in the sample. As the last two columns in Table 4 show, the
estimated coefﬁcient for capital account liberalization for the developing
countries is now very small in economic terms, and not statistically
different from zero at standard conﬁdence levels. However, the implied
44 All the regressions control for regional dummies for developing countries in Asia,
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East. In addition, the regressions control
for a country’s ratio of bank credit to private sector to GDP (or M2 to GDP) at the beginning
of 1980.
Table 4
Capital Account Liberalization and Financial Development
The dependent variable is
(Bank credit to private sector/GDP)1994–(Bank credit to private sector/GDP)1981 in columns (1) and (3).
The dependent variable is (M2/GDP)1994–(M2/GDP)1981 in columns (2) and (4).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Latin America 2.1646* 2.0918 2.2324* 2.2717**
East Asia 2.0438 .0591 2.1052 2.1168
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.2629** 2.1570** 2.3311** 2.3167**
Middle East 2.1894* .0266 2.2775* 2.1839
(Bank credit to private sector/GDP)1980 2.3001* 2.1042
(M2/GDP)1980 2.3799** 2.1430
(Bank credit to private sector/GDP1980)
3 Industrialized Countries dummy 2.4572*
(M2/GDP)1980 3 Industrialized
Countries dummy 2.4910*
Capital Account Liberalization index .1621** .1032* .0546 .0641
Capital Account Liberalization index 3
Industrialized Countries dummy .2984* .1256




N 9 79 99 79 9
R
2 .36 .32 .43 .39
Note:Regressionsincludeaconstantterm.*and**indicatesignificancelevelsof5and1percent,respectively.
a Sum of the coefficients of Capital Account Liberalization and Capital Account Liberalization 3 Industrialized
Countries dummy.
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ﬁnancial development, suggesting that industrialized countries with
more open capital accounts have indeed experienced a greater degree of
ﬁnancial deepening on average over the sample period (see also Klein
and Olivei 1999).45
Of course, these simple regressions are merely suggestive: The
dummy variable used for capital account liberalization is coarse, and an
omitted variable bias cannot be ruled out, since the regressions’ ﬁt is not
particularly strong. Moreover, policy choices regarding capital account
liberalization are endogenous, and to some extent determined by the level
of ﬁnancial development itself.46 Nevertheless, the results suggest that
capital account convertibility has beneﬁcial effects on the deepness of the
ﬁnancial system only when a country’s social and political institutions are
sufﬁciently strong.
While much more analysis is needed to support this claim, system-
atic evidence showing that developing countries with a more open capital
account have fared better in terms of ﬁnancial or economic indicators
remains elusive. The apparent lack of signiﬁcant beneﬁts from open
markets has strengthened the argument that developing countries should
reconsider the beneﬁts of free trade in ﬁnancial assets, and settle for a
second-best solution involving some form of capital controls. While the
few existing studies certainly suggest caution in liberalizing the capital
account, there is also a consensus among economists that capital controls
are a temporary device that in time must be phased out in favor of
ﬁrst-best regulatory and supervisory measures.
The available empirical evidence generally ﬁnds that controls on
capital inﬂows are effective at shifting the composition of ﬂows toward
the less volatile longer maturities. Montiel and Reinhart (1999), for
example, show for a panel of developing countries from 1990 to 1996 that
explicit capital inﬂow restrictions (in the form of taxes, quantitative
restrictions, or “prudential measures”) have succeeded in altering the
composition of capital inﬂows but have not reduced their size.47 Still,
while capital controls might successfully shield a country from some of
the failures associated with capital markets, they come at the cost of
inviting corruption where dishonest administrations are the rule.
In the end, when a country’s defenses against systemic risk are weak,
45 For example, the estimated coefﬁcient for the industrialized countries implies that
ﬁve additional years of capital account liberalization increase the end-of-period ratio of
bank credit to private sector to GDP by an average of more than 12 points.
46 The possibility of reverse causation would bias the results toward ﬁnding a positive
relationship between capital account liberalization and ﬁnancial development. Klein and
Olivei (1999), however, show that such a bias is not important.
47 However, the practical importance of capital controls in avoiding speculative
pressures in countries like Chile remains a subject of debate (see Edwards 1998).
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ment practices are inadequate, and ﬁnancial markets are thin, some form
of capital controls may be appropriate. But such controls should not be
taken as an excuse to slow the process of upgrading risk-measurement
and risk-management practices, of adopting new regulations, and of
putting in place new supervisory procedures. Should developing coun-
tries be pushed to adopt capital account convertibility? A “one size ﬁts
all” approach to capital market liberalization, mandated by the interna-
tional community, is likely to prove detrimental to some developing
countries if differences in institutional infrastructures are not taken into
explicit consideration. A premature liberalization runs the risk of leaving
a developing country hostage to the whims of a handful of international
investors, whose priorities need not coincide with a country’s long-run
development goals (compare Rodrik 1999).
WHAT ABOUT AN INTERNATIONAL LENDER OF LAST
RESORT?
Turning to the design of the international monetary system, does the
lack of an effective international lender of last resort increase the volatility
of investor behavior and contribute to international ﬁnancial crises? Or
has the recent use of big multilateral rescue packages created moral
hazard? The answer to both questions is most likely yes. Indeed, the
current situation, in which “rescues” are probable but far from assured,
may be particularly unstable. As Schwartz (1986) has pointed out, “a real
ﬁnancial crisis occurs only when institutions do not exist, when author-
ities are unschooled in the practices that preclude such a development,
and when the private sector has reason to doubt the dependability of
preventative arrangements.”48
In a national setting, governments generally opt for providing lender
of last resort (LLR) facilities—despite the incentives for moral hazard.
Following Bagehot (1873), in the face of a widespread demand for
currency that threatens solvent banks, the authorities lend freely, quickly,
usually at punitive rates, and usually against good collateral.49 Govern-
ments make this commitment because the public costs of a banking panic
are large and because the private sector is unable to fulﬁll this role since
lenders cannot quickly determine how a given shock will affect individ-
ual institutions. To limit moral hazard and the use of these facilities, the
authorities impose supervisory and regulatory standards and require,
through partial deposit insurance, capital adequacy standards, and the
48 Cited in Bordo 1989, pp. 7–8.
49 According to Bagehot, the collateral should be valued at pre-panic prices (Bordo
1989).
74 Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. Oliveilike, that the private sector share the cost of risk-taking gone awry.
Historians usually credit the development of LLR facilities over the past
two centuries with reducing the frequency and severity of national
banking crises (Kindleberger 1989; Bordo 1989). Still, episodes like the
U.S. savings and loan crisis and the New England banking crisis indicate
that sophisticated supervision and regulation and a ﬁnancial system that
values transparency and good governance do not in practice eliminate the
need for an LLR.
Bank panics take on global dimensions when spooked domestic and
foreign lenders withdraw funds from a national banking system and
demand hard currency. As already described, the economic contraction
caused by a bank panic/currency crisis tends to be larger than that
triggered by a purely domestic crisis because currency depreciation
multiplies the value (in domestic money) of the funds being withdrawn
from the fractional reserve banking system. Domestic authorities cannot
step into this unstable situation as LLR because they cannot create hard
currencies. Nor, it should be noted, is a country with a ﬂexible exchange
rate immune. Indeed, it is not uncommon for countries embracing some
form of ﬂexibility to face a currency panic.50 To limit the self-fulﬁlling
aspects of these crises and contagion to other areas, many observers
conclude that the world needs an international lender of last resort
(ILLR), even if that facility encourages moral hazard (Calomiris 1998;
Fischer 1999; Sachs 1995). Others, like Schwartz (1998), argue that the
costs of moral hazard dominate and that abolishing the IMF would let the
private market distribute liquidity to properly cautious and thus solvent
banks.
Clearly, the world does not have an international lender of last resort
today. Before the quota increase and the creation of the New Arrange-
ments to Borrow, IMF resources were tightly constrained. But even now,
the Fund cannot lend freely (since it cannot create hard currencies)51 nor
quickly (since it must get member approval of and borrower agreement
to its conditional loan programs). Because the Fund is seeking to restore
investor conﬁdence, these conditions must often involve improving
fundamentals, like reforming the banking system and reducing a budget
deﬁcit, efforts that usually take considerable time. Moreover, because the
Fund needs to ensure compliance by a sovereign country with often
50 Of the 30 crises identiﬁed by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1997), just over half occurred
in countries embracing some form of currency ﬂexibility, according to the IMF’s report on
exchange rate arrangements.
51 Fischer (1999) points out that an LLR often serves as a crisis manager, encouraging
others to make stabilizing loans (as the Fed did in the Long Term Capital Management
scare); thus, the LLR does not have to be able to create high-powered money itself. Sachs
(1995) and Radelet and Sachs (1998a) also focus on the ILLR’s role as a crisis manager
because they emphasize collective action problems in debt workouts.
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portions. But while loans conditioned on macro- and micro-policy
reforms are likely useful after the acute phase of the crisis, they are akin
to debtor-in-possession ﬁnance and differ in purpose from loans made by
a domestic LLR; they do little to limit “bad” outcomes in fast-moving
twin crises.
In addition, some analysts argue that these loan programs may
increase moral hazard by supplying governments with funds to bail out
foreign and domestic lenders, funds eventually repaid by LDC taxpay-
ers.52 Of course, holders of LDC equities and long-term bonds suffer
substantial losses if they seek to withdraw from these markets mid crisis.
Indeed, the Institute of International Finance estimates that private
creditors lost $350 billion in Asia and Russia last year. Thus, concerns
about moral hazard have generally focused on the banks—possibly
mistakenly, given that U.S. banks were clearly chastened by their Latin
losses in the 1980s.53 Still, banks in the crisis-stricken countries and their
foreign creditors do appear to have been the major beneﬁciaries of ofﬁcial
bailouts. For example, IMF funds let Korea’s government guarantee the
loans the foreign banks agreed to renew with extended maturity and an
interest rate 200-plus basis points above LIBOR. A participating banker
has described this deal as “a very proﬁtable restructuring.”
What then can be done to reduce the conﬂicts between the need for
ILLR facilities, the difﬁculties facing a multilateral institution trying to
provide them, and the moral hazard created by any lender of last resort?
The most modest and practical ideas focus on limiting the need for an
ILLR by improving disclosure, supervision and regulation, and good
governance throughout the private and public sectors. These steps would
tend to check euphoria in the private sector—a function the public sector
can perform fairly effectively. But they would not eliminate the need for
an ILLR.54
Other proposals seek to limit private creditors’ ability to bail out of
a crisis.55 Indeed, many private sector “bail-in” or burden-sharing ideas
closely resemble controls on capital outﬂows; they may be warranted on
occasion, but they entail serious trade-offs. For instance, prohibiting “put
52 The clear economic and political costs of a twin crisis surely limit moral hazard on the
part of LDC governments, although Russia may have been an exception.
53 Compared with lenders from other G-7 countries, U.S. banks’ exposure in Asia and
Russia was very circumspect, and their recent lending to Latin America has been relatively
restrained.
54 Of course, for disclosure to be helpful, investors must use the available data. It is not
clear that investors absorbed the BIS data showing the buildup of Asian debt in the mid
1990s.
55 Several of these ideas were endorsed by the G-7 ﬁnance ministers in their declaration
of October 1998.
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servicing costs linked to commodity prices might improve LDC ﬂexibility
but, most likely, at the expense of higher borrowing costs. And a required
“haircut” (small write-off) for banks refusing to renew loans during an
IMF-declared crisis (Litan 1998) might actually hasten that event as
investors try to rush out the door before the IMF shuts it.57 Finally, while
passage of standardized bankruptcy laws and the inclusion of collective
agreement clauses in sovereign bond contracts might speed the resolution
of difﬁcult defaults, the further step of requiring bondholders to restruc-
ture when bank creditors do might reduce future demand for LDC bonds.
Unlike measures that curb private sector euphoria in good times, many of
these burden-sharing efforts seek to limit creditor ﬂexibility in bad times
and are far less likely to succeed. They are also unlikely to eliminate the
need for a public ILLR.
Unfortunately, judging by recent events, the IMF is having a hard
time ﬁlling this role. Thus, it seems worth comparing its current pains-
taking approach—providing carefully negotiated loans of predetermined
size, conditioned on ﬁscal and other difﬁcult fundamental reforms—with
a traditional lender of last resort’s limited goals and modus operandi.58
For the traditional LLR, the goal is to prevent panic and contagion from
spreading through a banking system, in order to avoid driving previ-
ously solvent institutions into bankruptcy and causing a needless loss of
output. Speed and reliability are of the essence.
Moreover, because a currency crisis that is not accompanied by a
banking crisis is a good deal less costly than the two together, rethinking
the ILLR’s goal in traditional terms that focus on a troubled country’s
banking system might be worthwhile—even if such a facility is not
currently feasible. Calomiris (1998), Meltzer (1998), and Mishkin (1999)
advocate such a narrowly focused ILLR, and Calomiris lists crucially
important conditions for access to this facility, provisions intended to
allocate risk and reduce moral hazard.59 These readily observable criteria
include four requirements for the banking system: free entry, including
56 The IMF has identiﬁed $32 billion in puts on sovereign and private emerging market
debt callable in 1999 and 2000 (IMF 1999).
57 A “bail-in” idea with a somewhat different purpose urges states to set up private
credit lines to bolster hard currency liquidity. To their proponents, these arrangements are
substitutes for loans from the ILLR, not efforts to force the private sector to bear a greater
share of the cost of currency crises. But this approach also has its limits. Would all states be
able to arrange these lines? And would their use reduce the funds available to other
emerging markets in the same region or globally?
58 While the IMF’s new Supplement Reserve and Contingent Credit Facilities provide
relatively speedy and generous preventative funding, they still require conditions related to
macro policy. The approach did not prevent devaluation in Brazil. And could a pre-certiﬁed
nation ever be decertiﬁed without causing a crisis?
59 Calomiris sees these requirements as conditions for IMF membership. But the IMF
performs other useful tasks, like surveillance and data collection; thus, it seems better to link
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monitoring;60 reserve and liquidity ratios to cushion the impact of
currency depreciation; and deposit insurance. He also limits short-term
government debt. For countries with ﬁxed exchange rates, he adds
minimum requirements for foreign exchange reserves relative to the
monetary base and to export earnings, and the requirement that banks be
allowed to offer accounts denominated in foreign currencies. An addi-
tional condition, not on his list, would require central bank indepen-
dence.
In the event of a speculative attack, central banks in nations meeting
these criteria and providing internationally marketable collateral61 could
borrow short-term funds from the IMF without further conditions. Using
government securities supplied by members as collateral, the IMF would,
in turn, borrow these funds from a G-3 central bank. The point would not
be to maintain an unsustainable currency peg, revealed by a gradual,
extended decline in reserves, but to prevent sudden, self-fulﬁlling panic
from producing a “bad” outcome when a “better” outcome was possible.
In particular, such a facility might avoid or moderate twin-crisis conta-
gion while a traditional medium-term program conditioned on macro
reforms was being set up. Although such a facility is clearly not workable
today, considering ways to make it so seems a useful exercise since an
ILLR is unlikely to be truly effective until it can cope with international
bank panics.62
Such a limited purpose ILLR would not, of course, address the
serious need to ensure that countries in crisis can obtain working
capital—the equivalent of debtor-in-possession ﬁnance. Jeffrey Sachs and
others63 have called for IMF-imposed standstills followed by IMF guar-
antees on privileged new lending. But such standstills might entail the
same problems as private sector bail-ins. The social costs of restraining
these criteria to access to the ILLR facility rather than to IMF membership. This change
might also improve the idea’s political feasibility.
60 Two percentage points of required bank capital would take the form of subordinated
debt.
61 Ay, there’s the rub. Calomiris suggests collateral equal to 125 percent of the loan,
with 25 percent in foreign government securities. But if banks hold a signiﬁcant volume of
foreign government debt, they probably will not need an ILLR. Alternative solutions to the
problem of LDC collateral, possibly involving commodity-based revenue ﬂows, deserve
thought.
62 Lack of direct supervisory responsibility may not be an insurmountable impediment
to an ILLR. The Bank of England, the European Central Bank, and the Reserve Bank of
Australia already provide models of LLRs without that responsibility. These lenders will
need, and thus will develop, good working relations with the relevant regulators. The
Reserve Bank chair sits on the board of Australia’s new umbrella supervisor, for example.
63 Sachs (1995) and Radelet and Sachs (1998a) suggest that the IMF should be able to
trigger a standstill on debt service, facilitate privileged “debtor in possession” ﬁnancing,
and oversee a fair and efﬁcient workout. The restructuring of Korea’s debt in early 1998
exhibited some aspects of this approach, they argue.
78 Jane Sneddon Little and Giovanni P. Oliveilender actions in a domestic corporate or even municipal bankruptcy are
likely to differ greatly from those caused by international standstills. For
example, a corporate bankruptcy may brieﬂy curb lending to that ﬁrm’s
industry, but since information that permits lenders to distinguish
between potential borrowers is relatively easy to obtain in this setting, the
disruption is likely to be short. By contrast, emerging market crises are far
less transparent, especially given the possible role of contagion in and
between banking systems and currency markets. Thus, at least initially,
the public sector may have to provide debtor-in-possession ﬁnance, in the
form of traditional IMF/World Bank loans.
All told, international rescues undoubtedly create some moral haz-
ard, but the IMF’s inability to act as a reliable ILLR probably increases
investor volatility as well—a destabilizing combination. Improved dis-
closure and supervision should reduce moral hazard, but crises will
occur. Ideally, in such cases, a strictly conditional ILLR facility focused on
stemming panic in a banking system while traditional debtor-in-posses-
sion loans are arranged might be helpful in preventing contagion. While
such a facility faces obvious problems today, ﬁnding ways to make it
feasible deserve thought, for without such an ILLR, small nations are
more likely to look to currency blocs for protection from exchange rate
volatility. This trend would eliminate the role of the IMF as an interme-
diary ILLR and shift this burden to the private sector or to the central
bank providing the reference currency—for better or for worse.
POLICY COORDINATION
Recent crises vividly illustrate the potential for adverse spillovers
between economies. By consensus, for example, myopic supervision and
regulation in both borrowing and lending countries contributed to the
crisis. More broadly, while crisis indicators turn out to have limited
predictive use,64 efforts to develop these indicators often ﬂag a rise in G-7
interest rates as the spark that ignites a crisis. Conversely, then, did low
interest rates in the industrial world also play a role? The BIS has
certainly pointed with concern to the easy monetary policies and abun-
dant liquidity that brought interest rates to their lowest levels in years,
fed an appetite for risk, and encouraged the surge in capital ﬂows to the
emerging markets (Bisignano 1999). Should policymakers in the G-7 have
noted the joint impact of their policies on the developing countries? How
can governments encourage mutually beneﬁcial policies in neighboring
states?
Historically, the founders of the Bretton Woods system anticipated
64 They overpredict. See IMF (1998a); Kaminsky (1998); and Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1997).
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the competitive devaluations and beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the
interwar period. But in fact, IMF surveillance really only applies to small
countries, and only when they are in crisis. For the major countries, the
G-10 meetings provide an opportunity for policy coordination, an oppor-
tunity sometimes spent talking past each other.
Recently, however, two new approaches to surveillance have ap-
peared. The ﬁrst, an outgrowth of capital market liberalization, relies on
market forces to enforce the new international codes of conduct now
being developed in a growing number of areas. Early efforts included the
Basle capital adequacy standards and the Core Principles for banking
regulation. But global groups are now encouraging and constructing
agreements on good practice in everything from accounting to ﬁscal and
monetary policy to transparency.65 While multilateral institutions usually
develop these standards and will collect and disseminate the data and
commentary allowing investors to monitor adherence, the market will
actually provide the enforcement mechanism.66 Because borrowers are
always concerned about market perceptions—in good times as well as
bad—and because the market can be a strict disciplinarian, surveillance
by the private sector may turn out to be more effective than surveillance
by the IMF alone. Market discipline is also likely to be less political than
IMF oversight. This difference may be welcome to those worried that
nuclear states or nations sharing a border with the United States may get
special treatment. But on occasion, the difference may also create consid-
erable difﬁculty—especially when the markets exhibit abrupt swings in
investor sentiment. One LDC response might be the use of capital
controls. Another might be joining a currency bloc. Thus, the current
trend towards market-based discipline is unlikely to end the need for
governments to engage in policy coordination at some level, as EU
activities exemplify.
Indeed, the second approach to coordination uses treaties to bind
signatories to negotiated standards of good behavior. The primary
example is EMU’s Stability and Growth Pact, which commits EMU
members to maintain rather strict ﬁscal standards and imposes a ﬁne for
failure to do so. Because large deﬁcits can create incentives for monetiz-
ing the debt, the Germans refused to agree to EMU without a binding
ﬁscal commitment from their traditionally more debt-prone neighbors.
And the neighbors found the perceived political and economic beneﬁts of
monetary union sufﬁciently attractive to give up much ﬁscal as well as all
65 These bodies include the G-22 Working Groups on Transparency and Accountability,
on Strengthening Financial Systems, and on International Financial Crises.
66 Although the IMF could make compliance a pre-condition for obtaining multilateral
aid.
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on other matters such as tax policy and the supervision of ﬁnancial
institutions. In addition, while calls for a European ﬁscal policy entailing
signiﬁcant cross-border transfers have yet to build, they are likely to do
so, given these nations’ now-limited ability to cope with asymmetric
shocks. In other words, treaty commitments that limit policy ﬂexibility at
the national level are likely to spur supranational policymaking at the
regional level. Prospectively, moreover, proponents of dollarization the-
orize about negotiating treaties with the United States on the distribution
of seigniorage and LLR assistance.
To end on a political issue, since the dilemmas facing small, and not
so small, open economies and the absence of an effective ILLR are
provoking a growing interest in currency blocs and dollarization, it seems
worth asking if policymakers like the political implications of such an
outcome. If not, they may want to consider making more serious efforts
than heretofore at multilateral policy coordination.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper examines the conditions that have sparked interest in
reforming the international monetary system. The proximate causes are
the series of ﬁnancial crises that slowed world growth over the past two
years and brieﬂy threatened world ﬁnancial markets. The crises, in turn,
reﬂect recent environmental changes that pose difﬁcult policy dilemmas
for individual nations. In particular, the recent widespread trend toward
capital market liberalization has exposed many developing nations to the
full brunt of the policy trilemma for the ﬁrst time in many decades.
Accordingly, despite evidence of national policy ﬂaws, this review
suggests that the current “system” also contributed to the crises. In
particular, inadequate surveillance and policy coordination at many
levels and the less than constructive ambiguity surrounding the ILLR
may have played a role. In addition, the paper also argues that current
arrangements create unpalatable policy choices for many nations and that
the policy trilemma is even more limiting than ﬁrst described. While
unfettered capital ﬂows are (probably) growth-promoting and thus
desirable in the long run, they can be highly destabilizing in the short run.
Buffeted by erratic capital ﬂows, many nations ﬁnd it difﬁcult to create a
stable domestic environment whether they adopt ﬁxed or ﬂexible ex-
change rates. Unless some combination of better information, modest
capital controls,67 a more reliable ILLR, and more effective surveillance/
policy coordination allows governments to achieve greater stability, these
67 Such as Chilean-type taxes on capital inﬂows or, possibly, emergency controls on
capital outﬂows.
WHY THE INTEREST IN REFORM? 81nations seem likely to seek protection by joining a currency bloc—even if
these unions do not represent optimum currency areas. Such develop-
ments would shift the thorny issues of policy coordination and access to
LLR facilities to the regional level—at least temporarily.
The political implications of such changes would be vast and bear
consideration. Could continental currency blocs turn rivalrous, for in-
stance? (See Bergsten 1999.) How would relations between countries
providing and countries adopting an international currency evolve?
Might it be better, in the end, to deal with the difﬁcult issues of policy
coordination and LLR facilities at the global level sooner rather than
later?
We cannot answer these—or indeed many of the questions we have
raised—with any certainty. Thus, one message we take from our review
is that economists need to clarify the limits of our knowledge and be
cautious in offering policy advice, since we still do not have good
measures of the costs and beneﬁts of ﬂexible exchange rates, free capital
movements, or policy coordination.
A second message emphasizes the need for policymakers intent on
improving the international monetary system to take a systemic view. To
date, many proposals for reform have focused on speciﬁc aspects of the
problem—transparency and governance, for example. Improvements in
these areas and the market forces they engender should do a good deal to
encourage developing countries to adopt more mature ﬁnancial institu-
tions and better macro policies. Together, these changes should reduce
the severity of future crises. They will not, however, fully resolve the
conﬂicting needs of all countries—large and small—to participate in
integrated markets and to achieve stable economic growth. Absent a
multilateral approach, the evolution of the international monetary system
will reﬂect the struggle of individual nations to meet these needs.
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